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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-048/2
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. We show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, and we provide a lower bound of the inefficiency. The inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average at least 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, leading to a possible increase of income for the efficient player of 18.7% for men and 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question whether economic agents are successful optimizers.
Schlagwörter: 
Inefficiency
Frontier
Optimal strategy
Tennis
JEL: 
C14
C15
D01
D21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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