Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86648 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 07-096/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.
Schlagwörter: 
rent seeking
corruption
selection of officials
quasi-auction
sale of jobs
JEL: 
D73
H11
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
253.27 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.