Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86648
Authors: 
Hu, Audrey
Zhou, Liang
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 07-096/1
Abstract: 
A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.
Subjects: 
rent seeking
corruption
selection of officials
quasi-auction
sale of jobs
JEL: 
D73
H11
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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