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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 04-077/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible for a seeming bounded rational behavior of the network and shows their similarities and distinctions. Two special cases of filtering selection procedures are investigated, where the overload takes its most limiting forms. The model developed in the paper can be applied both to organizations and to individuals. It can serve as a rational foundation for bounded rationality.
Schlagwörter: 
Screening
Multistage Selection
Information Overload
Bounded Rationality
JEL: 
D70
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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