Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86596
Authors: 
Gächter, Simon
Riedl, Arno
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-044/1
Abstract: 
Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.
Subjects: 
Bankruptcy problems with claims
proportional rule
equal-awards rule
equal-losses rule
fairness
laboratory experiment
vignette
JEL: 
D63
C78
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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