Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86565
Authors: 
Staal, Klaas
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-026/1
Abstract: 
This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in smallcountries have greater influence over the nature of political decision mak-ing while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more publicgoods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessiveincentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of seces-sion rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreasescountry size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy arelarger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.
Subjects: 
country size
public spending
structure of government
JEL: 
D7
H1
H2
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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