Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86550
Authors: 
Francois, Joseph F.
Niels, Gunnar
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-011/2
Abstract: 
We examine the role of political factors in Mexico’s antidumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to antidumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on antidumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the U.S. and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.
Subjects: 
antidumping
political economy of trade policy
Mexico
endogenous import protection
endogenous tariffs
JEL: 
F10
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
174.37 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.