Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86549
Authors: 
Houba, Harold
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05-064/1
Abstract: 
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard optimization packages is straightforward.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Negotiation
Alternating offers
subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash bargaining solution
Maximum Theorem
Applied General Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
C73
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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