Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86515
Authors: 
Swank, Job
Swank, Otto
Visser, Bauke
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 06-051/1
Abstract: 
Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.
Subjects: 
Committees
pre-meetings
reputational concerns
transparency
JEL: 
D71
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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