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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 04-013/3
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries.In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questionshave received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to firstdemonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular groupof citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes receivedby the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges hisduties.
Schlagwörter: 
Bribery
Corruption
Favoritism
Queuing Theory
Wait Time
JEL: 
D80
H40
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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