Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86507
Authors: 
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez
Swank, Otto H.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-133/1
Abstract: 
A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
Subjects: 
information collection
spatial voting models
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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