Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86464
Authors: 
van der Laan, Gerard
Pruzhansky, Vitaly
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-121/1
Abstract: 
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively simple games various inefficiencies can arise.
Subjects: 
Aspirations
bargaining set
core
von Neumann-Morgenstern vector
stable set
JEL: 
C70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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