Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86361
Authors: 
Berk, Jan Marc
Bierut, Beata K.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-029/2
Abstract: 
We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
Subjects: 
Monetary policy
interest rates
learning
JEL: 
E52
E58
D83
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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