Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86356
Authors: 
de Jong, Philip
Lindeboom, Maarten
van der Klaauw, Bas
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 06-018/3
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
Subjects: 
disability insurance
sickness absenteeism
policy evaluation
self-screening
experiment
JEL: 
J28
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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