Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86354
Authors: 
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05-104/1
Abstract: 
Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.
Subjects: 
Cartel stability
detection probabilities
statue of limitation.
JEL: 
K21
K42
L12
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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