Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86342
Authors: 
Visser, Bauke
Swank, Otto H.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05-028/1
Abstract: 
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously. We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also, reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public.
Subjects: 
Committees
communication
reputational concerns
strategic voting
JEL: 
D71
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
443.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.