Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86314
Authors: 
Caserta, Silvia
de Vries, Casper G.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05-031/2
Abstract: 
We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except for a few simple distribution function for the bidders' valuations. We show that these expressions can be well approximated using extreme value theory without assuming a particular distribution function. The theory is applied to data from Internet auctions.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Numerous bidders
Extreme values
Internet auctions
JEL: 
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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