Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86296
Authors: 
Delfgaauw, Josse
Dur, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-060/1
Abstract: 
Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted.
Subjects: 
Public Sector Labour Markets
Incentive Contracts
Work Ethics
Public Service Motivation
JEL: 
H1
J3
J4
L3
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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