Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86258
Authors: 
Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 05-034/1
Abstract: 
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Subjects: 
Spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups.
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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