Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86243
Authors: 
Ficco, Stefano
Karamychev, Vladimir
van Reeven, Peran
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 06-001/1
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the behavior of an individual who wants to maximize his utility function, but he is not able to evaluate it. There are many ways to choose a single alternative from a given set. We show that a unique utility maximizing procedure exists. Choices induced by this optimal procedure are always transitive but generally violate the Weak Axiom. In other words, utility maximizing individuals who are unable to evaluate their objective functions fail to exhibit rational revealed preferences.
Subjects: 
Bounded rationality
optimal selection procedure
procedural rationality
JEL: 
D01
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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