Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86142
Authors: 
van Veldhuizen, Roel
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2013-210
Abstract: 
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.
Subjects: 
Bribery
corruption
experimental economics
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
D73
C91
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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