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Autoren: 
Morton, Rebecca B.
Piovesan, Marco
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Datum: 
2013
Reihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2013-209
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters.
Schlagwörter: 
Condorcet Jury Theorem
information aggregation
majority voting
social information
JEL: 
C92
D7
D02
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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