Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86141
Authors: 
Morton, Rebecca B.
Piovesan, Marco
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2013-209
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters.
Subjects: 
Condorcet Jury Theorem
information aggregation
majority voting
social information
JEL: 
C92
D7
D02
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
546.05 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.