Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86134
Authors: 
González Padilla, Héctor Gustavo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) 2010/49
Abstract (Translated): 
The profit-maximizing and oligopoly bank model developed by Bresnahan and Lau allows determining the degree of market power held by an average bank. The equilibrium price equation includes a mark up, which is not used in the case of perfect competition but which is partially used in the case of oligopoly or monopolistic competition, and it is fully used in the case of monopoly. This paper explores the degree of competition in the credit market of Argentina in the period 2002-2007. The hypothesis of perfect competition in the loan market can be rejected.
Subjects: 
Argentina
banks
Cournot equilibrium
market power
loan markets
oligopoly
perfect competition
JEL: 
E43
E51
F36
G21
L1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
187.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.