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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 02-059/2
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
In organizations, ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals. However, those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas. This commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior's prior belief. We refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices.
Schlagwörter: 
management science
capital investments
budget
capital budget
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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