Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85876 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 02-056/3
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision.If all of the costs of public goods are shared through a common budget, policy makersdelegate bargaining to ‘public good lovers’, resulting in overprovision of public goods. If asufficiently large part of the costs can not be shared, underprovision persists because policymakers delegate bargaining to ‘conservatives’. We derive financing rules that eliminate theincentives for strategic delegation.
Schlagwörter: 
Centralised decision making
strategic delegation
financing rules.
JEL: 
D72
D78
H11
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
271.62 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.