Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85852
Authors: 
Gächter, Simon
Riedl, Arno
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 03-055/1
Abstract: 
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experimentwe provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligationsthrough the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape openingoffers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue thatentitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent ofnegotiators' legal property rights.
Subjects: 
Moral property rights
fairness judgments
bargaining with claims
self-serving bias
JEL: 
A12
D63
C78
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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