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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-004/3
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker. For each a, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all vacancies post the same wage. When a= 1, the common posted wage lies between the competitive and monopsony levels, and equilibrium is efficient. When a > 1, all vacancies post the monopsony wage. Some workers fail to find a job, some find a job at the monopsony wage, and some—those for whom there is competition—get the competitive wage. Equilibrium is inefficient when a > 1; in particular, there is excessive vacancy creation.
Schlagwörter: 
directed search
matching
wage dispersion
efficiency.
JEL: 
J64
D83
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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