Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85806 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 02-123/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of aproject. A smart agent's efforts make him better informed; a dumb agent's efforts are to no avail. If an agent does not know his type, pride is socially beneficial. If an agent knows his type, a dumb agent takes inefficient, unconventional decisions to mimick a smart agent. The latter exerts more effort in order not to be mistaken for a dumb. This holds whether or not project rejection is a save haven for the dumb.
Schlagwörter: 
Reputation
Information Collection
JEL: 
D72
D83
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
249.53 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.