Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85775
Authors: 
Pruzhansky, Vitaly
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 03-098/1
Abstract: 
We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this result are twofold. First, it lessens computational burden while computing minimal curb sets. Second, it implies that the profile of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies is always stochastically stable in a certain class of games.
Subjects: 
rationalizability
stochastic stability
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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