Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85772
Authors: 
van der Heijden, Eline C.M.
Nelissen, Jan H.M.
Potters, Jan J.M.
Verbon, Harrie A.A.
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 01-087/3
Abstract: 
We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon theunique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is thatthere are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange,respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not onlymutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examinewhether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected bythe move and matching structure of the game.
Subjects: 
experiments
reciprocity
trust
coordination
gift exchange
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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