Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85746 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-028/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high) unemployment only if a job offers a high enough wage. Themain result, therefore,says that a firm sets higher wages, the higher unemployment. As themodel is applicable tothe upper segment of the labour market, the result is in line withthe empirical fact thatincome inequality increases when more people are unemployed.
Schlagwörter: 
Monopsony Power
Labor Market
Screening
JEL: 
C72
D82
J42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
73.21 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.