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Autoren: 
Goeree, Jacob K.
Offerman, Theo
Datum: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-044/1
Zusammenfassung: 
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
inefficiencies
information disclosure
competition
JEL: 
C72
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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