Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85733
Authors: 
Goeree, Jacob K.
Offerman, Theo
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 00-044/1
Abstract: 
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.
Subjects: 
Auctions
inefficiencies
information disclosure
competition
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
349.44 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.