Abstract:
We explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on acongested road network with heterogeneous users and allowing for elasticdemand. Heterogeneity is represented by a continuum of values of time. Thenetwork consists of both serial and parallel links, which allows us to modelsecond-best pricing restrictions on either complementary or substitute links,while still accounting for interaction between different groups on sharedlinks (e.g. in city centres). We find that private (revenue-maximizing)pricing is much less efficient than public pricing, whether on the partial orthe full network; but this difference is mitigated by the productdifferentiation made possible by heterogeneous users. Ignoring heterogeneitycauses the welfare benefits of second-best pricing of one parallel link, apolicy currently receiving favourable consideration, to be dramaticallyunderestimated. Product differentiation produces some unexpecteddistributional effects, including the possibility that first-best pricing canresult in one of the parallel routes being both more congested than withoutpricing.