Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85692 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-038/3
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
This paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types, free entry and transferable utility. We apply a second-order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium, derive the cost of search and show that it is decreasing in the substitutability of worker types. This cost of search is then decomposed into three components: unemployment, vacancy costs and mismatch. Our contact technology rules out congestion effects between different worker types and therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale. One third of those increasing returns in contacts are shown to be absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy. The resulting equilibrium is not efficient. Unemployment benefits can reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy. Numerical simulations of the model show that our Taylor expansions are quite accurate.
Subjects: 
Employment
Employee Selection
Unemployment
Employees
Labor
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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