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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 99-053/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means ofdirect coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices suchas contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In alocal interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient combined punishment potential have signalled their willingness to form such an authority, conditional upon the willigness of others todo so. Given a specific timing of decisions, we analyse the conditions under which authorities arise and under which they evolve into a stationary state with only one or several remaining authorities.
Schlagwörter: 
Central Authorities
Cooperation
Evolution
Externalities
Local Interaction
JEL: 
B25
C7
D62
D70
H1
H4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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