Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85507
Authors: 
Baye, Michael R.
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 00-103/2
Abstract: 
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.
Subjects: 
Auctions
contests
litigation
fee-shifting
JEL: 
D8
K4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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