Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Francois, Joseph F.
Martin, Will
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 98-059/2
Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines likeOECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Roundbindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain thisvariability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protectionand offer a formalization of the concept of market access, emphasizing both the first and secondmoments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination ofUruguay Round agricultural bindings.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
141.67 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.