Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85429
Autoren: 
Offerman, Theo
Potters, Jan
Datum: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-046/1
Zusammenfassung: 
On an increasing scale auctions are used to allocate the licenses tooperate on markets which are thought notsuited for free entry. According to standard economic arguments, thelicense fees paid at the auction will notaffect consumer prices since they constitute a sunk cost. Thisstandard view is not uncontested though. In thepresent paper we experimentally investigate two arguments for apotential upward effect of auctioning onprices: the incorporation of entry fees in prices due to the use ofmark-up pricing rules, and the tendency ofauctions to select the more collusive firms. Our results indicatethat auctioning increases the probability of highprices, and that this is mainly due to the use of mark-up pricingrules.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
385.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.