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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 97-023/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, our model provides an explanation for some perceived changes in the Dutch policy making process.
Dokumentart: 
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