Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Dur, Robert A.J.
Swank, Otto H.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 97-023/1
Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, our model provides an explanation for some perceived changes in the Dutch policy making process.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
92.14 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.