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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers on Risk and Insurance No. 26
Verlag: 
Hamburg University, Institute for Risk and Insurance, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period framework. Here risk management incentives and consumption smoothing incentives are traded off, and the monotonic relationship between self-insurance and risk aversion may no longer hold as more risk-averse agents cannot always afford spending more on self-insurance. A very similar relationship holds for self-protection making self-insurance and self-protection much more alike in a two-period model. We also extend the model to a joint analysis of self-insurance/self-protection and saving decisions.
Schlagwörter: 
self-insurance
self-protection
risk aversion
time structure
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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