Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85322 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2013-208
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion.
Schlagwörter: 
information revelation
privacy
lemons market
level-k reasoning
quantalresponse equilibrium
inequality aversion
JEL: 
C72
C90
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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