Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85266
Authors: 
Hunold, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 13-081
Abstract: 
Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law.
Subjects: 
competition law
cartel damage compensation
deterrence
overcharge
private enforcement
vertical relations
JEL: 
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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