Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85254
Authors: 
Heuson, Clemens
Peters, Wolfgang
Schwarze, Reimund
Topp, Anna-Katharina
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
UFZ Discussion Papers 13/2013
Abstract: 
It is well established that adaptation and technological investment in each case may serve as a commitment device in international climate politics. This paper for the first time analyzes the combined impact of these two strategic variables on global mitigation within a noncooperative framework where countries either decide on mitigation before or after adaptation. By investment, which is assumed to be made in the first place due to its considerable lead time, countries commit to lower national contributions to the global public good of mitigation. We find that the sequencing of adaptation before mitigation reinforces this strategic effect of technological investments at least for sufficiently similar countries. As a consequence, the subgame-perfect equilibrium yields a globally lower level of mitigation and higher global costs of climate change when adaptation is decided before mitigation. Besides this theoretical contribution, the paper proposes some strategies to combat the unfortunate rush to adaptation which can be currently observed in climate politics.
Subjects: 
adaptation
climate policy
investment
mitigation
non-cooperative behavior
JEL: 
Q54
H41
H87
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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