Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85210
Authors: 
Eggert, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
CoFE Discussion Paper 99/15
Abstract: 
Models of international tax competition typically assume the existence of a benevolent government. This paper presents a model which integrates the view of government as source of inefficiency with an analysis of distorting taxes on capital investment, savings and labor income in a common theoretical framework. The model yields the conclusion that the effects of international tax coordination on the welfare of residents can be ambiguous because the costs of inefficient public good supply are lowered but wateful government consumption is increased. However, the above finding is derived when the residence-based capital tax is not available. In contrast, government use of taxes clearly is inefficient from the viewpoint of residents in the presence of residence-based capital taxation.
JEL: 
H1
H2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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