Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85056
Authors: 
Herrera, Luis Ángel
Rosellón, Juan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1327
Abstract: 
To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been identified. To discern these parameters is the motivation for the research presented in this paper. We study how different weight parameters affect the distributive characteristics of optimal price-cap incentive regulation for electricity transmission. We find that a regulator's use of ideal (Laspeyres) weights tends to be more beneficial for the Transco (consumers) than for consumers (the Transco).
Subjects: 
electricity transmission
incentive regulation
distributive efficiency
JEL: 
L50
L51
L94
Q40
Q42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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