Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85044
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Winter, Fabian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-017
Abstract: 
Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information theoretically and experimentally. Rather than distinguishing two very different sequential games, we use the same game format and capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater efficiency losses off the equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally.
Subjects: 
off-equilibrium play
screening
signaling
sorting
wage bargaining
JEL: 
C9
D82
J24
J40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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