Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85040 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2013-021
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mechanism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism remains conducive to efficiency when negative cost, but less efficient, projects are made available. We find that this is not the case. On the other hand, we detect no significant difference in bid levels depending on whether mixed feelings are present or absent, and on whether the others´ valuations are known or unknown.
Schlagwörter: 
bidding behavior
experiment
procedural fairness
public projects
JEL: 
C72
C92
D63
H44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
508.99 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.